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I. Introduction
Legal developments in the European Union epitomised
by the entry into force of Regulation 1/20031 envisage
enforcement not only by the competition authorities of
the Member States, but also enforcement through
litigation between private parties before the national
courts. The Regulation exhibits an acknowledgement that
each EUMember State has a sophisticated national court
system and regulatory infrastructure to embark on the
heavy load of enforcement of competition laws. Articles
101 and 102 TFEU have long been conceded to have
direct effect and to create rights for individuals, which
national courts must protect.2 On several occasions the
European Commission and the Court of Justice
accentuated that the full effectiveness of the EU
competition rules (i.e. arts 101 and 102 TFEU) requires
that any individual can effectively claim compensation
for the harm caused by an infringement of these rules.3
The European Commission has taken a number of steps
to create an effective private antitrust enforcement
framework, such as a Green Paper in 20044 and a White
Paper in 20085 with other guidance to be issued soon.6
These proposals are alleged to be “balanced measures
that are rooted in European legal culture and traditions”.7
There is also well established Union case-law upholding
the need to adapt and develop national procedures and
remedies so as to secure the effectiveness of Union law
rights by providing options for redress.8 While the right
to compensation is recognised by EU law it does not
amplify the procedural structure for a private action and
therefore it has had little impact upon the private
enforcement of competition law in Lithuania, as a range
of hurdles currently stand in the way of injured parties
effectively receiving compensation in Lithuania. Unlike
public enforcement, which principally predominates in
Lithuania, private enforcement is largely underdeveloped
supporting a general view that private actions against
anticompetitive behaviour is of little significance in the
overall enforcement scheme in the Member States of the
European Union.9
There is an elaborate legislative framework for the
private enforcement of competition law in Lithuania, with
the exception of collective redress. However, the actual
practice is rather scarce. There have only been a handful
of competition cases in private enforcement; even fewer
of these were successful. The Competition Council of
Lithuania calculated that infringements of competition
law per annum incur LT154.75 million (approx. €44.82
million) of direct loss.10 However, the competition
authority of Lithuania has limited resources and is unable
to investigate every alleged infringement of the
competition rules.11 Underdevelopment of private
enforcement in Lithuania, which can be an important
complement to public enforcement, means that the
deterrent effect of competition rules is not as great as it
should be and the victims of anticompetitive activities
are not compensated for their losses,12which is guaranteed
by EU law. Akin to public enforcement, private actions
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1Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of December 16, 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in arts 81 and 82 of the Treaty OJ L 001, 04/01/2003.
“national courts have an essential part to play in applying the Community [now Union] competition rules. When deciding disputes between private individuals, they protect
the subjective rights under Community [now Union] law, for example by awarding damages to the victims of infringements.” (at Recital 7)
2 See for instance, BRT and SABAM (127/73) [1974] E.C.R. 51.
3Draft Guidance Paper Quantifying Harm in Actions for Damages Based on Breaches of Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,
European Commission, June 2011.
4Green Paper - Damages actions for breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM(2005) 672, December 19, 2005.
5White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC antitrust rules, COM(2008) 165, April 2, 2008.
6 For instance, in June 2011 the Directorate-General for Competition issued the Draft Guidance Paper on Quantifying Harm in Actions for Damages Based on Breaches of
Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. The Commission Work Programme 2012 included a legislative initiative on actions for damages
for breaches of antitrust law.
7White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC antitrust rules, 3.
8 In Courage v Crehan (C-453/99) [2002] Q.B. 507; [2001] 3 W.L.R. 1646 the court held that national courts must provide a remedy in damages for the enforcement of the
rights and obligations defined in art.101 TFEU.
9The conclusionmade by the Ashurst report. DenisWaelbroeck, Donald Slater and Gil Even-Shoshan, Study on the Conditions of Claims for Damages in Case of Infringement
of EC Competition Rules, Comparative Report (August 2004)http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/comparative_report_clean_en.pdf [Accessed
November 20, 2012].
10The Competition Council of Lithuania, Assessing the Impact of the Work of the Competition Council: Benefits to Consumers are Obvious (Press release, October 6, 2011).
11Although the Competition Council places efforts to strengthen the enforcement of competition rules, these efforts are constantly being restricted by one of the lowest
budgets in comparison with other EU institutions (Šarunas Keserauskas, Chairman of the Competition Council, Foreword of the Annual Report of 2011). On September
20, 2011 the President of the Republic introduced a new draft Competition Act to the Parliament, where prioritisation is at the core of the reform package. The Competition
Council will give priority to investigations of illegal agreements that create the biggest harm to consumers and petty commercial disputes with no public interest will not
be considered. Such practice is already applied in other jurisdictions, such as the United Kingdom.
12 Jurate Šoviene, “The Relationship between Public and Private Enforcement in Lithuania” presented at the seminar on December 14, 2011, Vilnius, Lithuania.
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can also assist in developing a culture of competition
amongst market participants, including consumers, and
raising overall awareness of competition law.
The aim of this paper is to explore the extent to which
private enforcement of competition law is workable in
practice in Lithuania, whether there is a legal basis for it
and what challenges undertakings, customers and
consumers face in invoking a claim for damages resulting
from an infringement of competition law. Explicit
recourse to methodology is essential (section II) in order
to define the empirical research undertaken and explain
the process how the relevant cases were identified and
delineated. Given that Lithuania only reappeared on the
European map in 1991, this paper will also discuss the
historical development of the Lithuanian legal system in
section III. Thereafter, the following sections address
various relevant aspects, such as the legal basis for private
enforcement in Lithuania (section IV), the passing on
defence and indirect purchasers (section V), damages
(section VI), litigation costs (section VII), collective
redress and representative groups (section VIII). Finally,
the case studies will be extensively discussed (section
IX) culminating with potential reasons for a lack of
private enforcement of competition law in Lithuania
(section X) and concluding remarks (section XI).
II. Methodology and empirical findings
As far as methodology is concerned, the empirical
research was conducted in order to comprehensively
identify all competition law cases before the national
courts of Lithuania where the parties were seeking to
exercise rights conferred to them either by the Treaty’s
arts 101 TFEU and 102 TFEU or the equivalent domestic
legislation—arts 5 and 9 of the Law on Competition
respectively. The research started with informal contacts
with lawyers as well as the officials of the Competition
Council in Lithuania in order to uncover the current
situation of private enforcement of competition law in
Lithuania. To supplement the initial research, the Infolex
search engine was used to pinpoint cases that appeared
before the Lithuanian domestic courts. Different searching
terms were used ranging from more general, such as
“Konkurencija” (Competition) to more specific “Article
5 of the Law on Competition”, “Article 9 of the Law on
Competition”, “Article 81 EC”, “Article 82 EC” as well
as “Article 101 TFEU” and “Article 102 TFEU” in order
to “catch” the most recent cases. The research undertaken
covered the period 2000–2012 inclusive and revealed that
there is a significant amount of private damages cases in
the field of unfair competition,13 especially with regard
to trademark infringements, that does not appear in the
plethora of EU competition law and therefore these cases
were discounted for this research. The study also
dismissed the damages actions, involving an article for
entities of public administration,14 concentration
infringements,15 appeals against the decision of the
Competition Council of Lithuania and public procurement
cases. From a purely competition law perspective,
specifically arts 101 TFEU and 102 TFEU and its
domestic equivalence—arts 5 and 9 of the Law on
Competition, there have been only five judgements
discovered in private enforcement and one case is
pending.16 Out of these cases there were two cases
regarding infringement of art.5 of the Law onCompetition
(domestic art.101 TFEU), two on art.9 of the Law on
Competition (domestic art.102 TFEU) and the final case
involved a combination of both arts 101 TFEU and 102
TFEU.17 First instance and appeal decisions were counted
as one case if the same parties and the same subject matter
were addressed.
To have a more comprehensive outlook, the research
embraced two ways where the antitrust prohibitions can
be used in private enforcement, such as a “sword” (i.e.
used by parties as a basis for claiming damages or
injunctive relief) and a “shield” (i.e. the cases where the
competition law provisions are used in defence against a
contractual claim mainly to avoid the contract). There
have been two private damages cases in Lithuania and
additionally one more case, which successfully secured
an injunction, is pending. The last two cases used
competition law in their defences. However, several cases
with an attempt to use competition law as a shield were
excluded where the court failed to consider the
competition law issue due to the lack of relevance.18Given
that details of settlements are usually not public, as
secrecy is a condition; all competition litigation
settlements were eliminated from the dataset of this
research. For example, it is known that at least two
competition cases UAB “Belvedere prekyba” / SPAB
“Stumbras” andUAB “Palink” / SPAB “Stumbras” ended
in litigation settlement.
13Article 16(1) of the Law on Competition (No. XI-1937, 22/03/2012) prohibits the acts of unfair competition, such as unauthorised use of a trade mark identical or similar
to the name, registered trade mark or unregistered well known trade mark or any other reference having a distinguishing feature of another undertaking, imitating the product
or product packaging of another undertaking, copying the shape, colour or other distinguishing features of that product or product packaging, and misleading advertising
etc.
14Article 4 of the Law on Competition (No. XI-1937, 22/03/2012) provides that “when carrying out the assigned tasks related to the regulation of economic activity ...
entities of public administration ... shall be prohibited from adopting legal acts or other decisions which grant privileges to or discriminate against any individual undertakings
or their groups and which give rise to or may give rise to differences in the conditions of competition for undertakings competing in the relevant market, except where the
difference in the conditions of competition cannot be avoided when the requirements of the laws of the Republic of Lithuania are complied with”.
15Articles 10–15 of the Law on Competition (No. XI-1937, 22/03/2012).
16 See Table 1.
17 See Table 1.
18 For instance, case No. 2A-149-340/2011; case No. 2-8595-450/2010 (in Lithuanian).
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Level of CourtCitationCase Name
February 2, 2004DefenceDomestic art.101
TFEU
Stand-aloneCourt of AppealNo. 2A-79/2004UAB “MBR parduotuvių ir
restoranų įranga” / IĮ E.A.
May 26, 2006DamagesDomestic art.102
TFEU
Follow-onCourt of AppealNo. 2A-41/2006UAB “Šiaulių tara”/SPAB
“Stumbras”
December 31, 2008InjunctionA combinationFollow-onCourt of AppealNo. 2-949/2008AB “flyLAL-Lithuanian
Airlines” / “Air Baltic Corpo-
ration” A/S and Airport
“Ryga”
May 17, 2010DamagesDomestic art.102
TFEU
Follow-onSupreme CourtNo. 3K-3-207/2010LUAB “Klevo lapas”/AB
“ORLEN Lietuva”
December 22, 2011DefenceDomestic art.101
TFEU
Stand-aloneCourt of AppealNo. 2-2655/2011UAB “Naftos grupe”/AB
“Klaipedos nafta”
Private enforcement of competition law is a
complement to, not a substitute for, vigorous public
enforcement of national competition authorities and the
European Commission.19 However, the extent to which
private enforcement of competition law complements
public enforcement depends on the ration of stand-alone
claims and follow-on actions. Similar to other Member
States art.47(1) of the Law on Competition in Lithuania
also allows two types of actions: i) a so called
“standalone” action, where a person must prove an
infringement of the competition rules without the benefit
of a prior decision to that effect by the Competition
Council of Lithuania (or other Competition Authorities,
including the European Commission); ii) a follow-on
action, which is pursuant to findings of an infringement
of competition law by the Competition Council of
Lithuania (or other Competition Authorities, including
the European Commission). During the analysed period
between 2000 and 2012 there were two stand-alone cases
and three follow-on cases.20 Yet, both stand-alone cases
used the infringement of competition law as a defence
(albeit unsuccessfully) in order to avoid the contract. This
is because stand-alone cases are deemed to be complex
and difficult to litigate due to the lack of easily available
evidence.21 Follow-on litigation, on the other side of the
coin, benefits from preceding public efforts, as it eases
costs and results in higher awards22 making follow-on
actions more attractive. Given that the decisions of the
Competition Council have probative value,23 persons (so
far only undertakings) in Lithuania prefer to lodge a
complaint to the Competition Council to investigate
suspected anti-competitive practices rather than bringing
an action directly to the court resulting in both damages
cases being the follow-on actions.24 The study also
compared public cases decided by the Competition
Council of Lithuania with private cases. Only the public
cases with substantive infringements of arts 101 TFEU
and 102 TFEU and their domestic equivalence were
considered that can be used in the follow-on actions in
private enforcement. All the cases of administrative
procedural matter, cease-and-desist proceedings that were
closed were excluded from this research. Chart 1 reveals
that public enforcement predominates in Lithuania in the
field of competition law with barely any private
enforcement. Although the actual level of private
competition enforcement in Lithuania is likely to be
higher due to settlements, dropped or dismissed claims,
it is evident that the situation in Lithuania upholds the
widespread underdevelopment assumption in private
competition damages actions in the European Union.25
19White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC antitrust rules, 2–3.
20 See Table 1.
21Thomas E. Kauper and Edward A. Snyder, “An Inquiry into the Efficiency of Private Antitrust Enforcement: Follow-on and Independently Initiated Cases Compared”
(1986) 74 Georgetown Law Journal 1163.
22Kauper and Snyder, “An Inquiry into the Efficiency of Private Antitrust Enforcement” (1986) 74 Georgetown Law Journal 1163, 1169.
23UAB “Šiaulių tara”/SPAB “Stumbras” No. 2A-41/2006 (in Lithuanian).
24UAB “Šiaulių tara”/SPAB “Stumbras” No. 2A-41/2006 and UAB “Klevo lapas”/AB “ORLEN Lietuva” No. 3K-3-207/2010 (in Lithuanian).
25Waelbroeck, Slater and Even-Shoshan Study on the Conditions of Claims for Damages in Case of Infringement of EC Competition Rules, Comparative Report (August
2004) http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/comparative_report_clean_en.pdf [Accessed November 20, 2012].
Centre for European Policy Studies,Making antitrust damages actions more effective in the EU: welfare impact and potential scenarios (Final Report, DGCOMP/2006/A3/012,
2007) http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/files_white_paper/impact_study.pdf [Accessed December 1, 2012]; and most recently Directorate-General
for Internal Policies, Collective Redress in Antitrust (Study, IP/A/ECON/ST/2011-19, June 2012) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/committees/en/studiesdownload
.html?languageDocument=EN&file=74351 [Accessed November 20, 2012].
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Chart 1—Public and private enforcement
III. Historical Background of Private
Enforcement
The modern Lithuanian legal system and litigation are
relatively new. The Republic of Lithuania regained
independence on March 11, 1990, but international
recognition of Lithuania only came a year later after the
final collapse of the Soviet Union. Lithuania’s history
has been marked with a constant threat from its large
neighbours shadowed by several occupations, which have
stalled the development of the uniform Lithuanian legal
system. For instance, during its independence phase of
1918–1940, the national Lithuanian legal system was
highly divided: the Russian Imperial Civil Law of 1840
was employed in most of the territory, the Uznemune
region used the 1804 Napoleon Civil Code, while the
German’s Civil Code BGB of 1900 was applied in
Klaipeda (Memel) and finally the 1864 Collection of Civil
Laws of the Baltic Provinces was used in Palanga and
Zarasai.26 While there were some endeavours to unify
Lithuanian private law throughout the period of
1937–1940, progress to produce the Lithuanian Civil
Code was delayed due to the Soviet invasion in 1940 and
was never accomplished.27 The draft of World War II
Lithuanian Code disappeared without trace and the new
Codes were started from scratch when Lithuania regained
its independence in 1991. This means that modern private
enforcement in Lithuania is in its infancy, which officially
started since the introduction of the new Civil Code in
2001 and the Code of Civil Procedure in 2003 providing
a legal basis for private enforcement (alongside the
reforms of the courts system).
Insofar as more specialised law is concerned, the
history of Lithuanian competition law embarked with the
adoption of the first Law on Competition on September
15, 1992 and has been commemorated by a gradual
adjustment of national competition rules to meet the EU
competition law standards. The signing of Free Trade
Agreements with the European Community [nowUnion]
and its Member States were the first steps of Lithuania
on accession to the European Union.28 Shortly after
Lithuania signed the Association Agreements29 (Europe
Agreements) and committed itself to the EU policy. Prior
to the accession to the EU Lithuania, like other candidate
countries at the time had to implement modern EU
compliant competition laws and establish attendant
institutions as part of the harmonisation of its legal
framework with the acquis communautaire—an essential
pre-condition for admittance. This meant that the
Lithuanian rules on competition had to echo those of the
European Union, which instigated changes to the Law on
Competition.30 The 1999 Law on Competition also
re-organised the Competition Council, which initially
existed within the Agency of Prices and Competition
under the Ministry of Economy, and was formed on the
basis of the former State Price Committee.31 The
Competition Council of Lithuania is now an independent
body responsible for the enforcement of competition law
26Valentinas Mikelenas, “Unification and Harmonisation of Law at the Turn of the Millennium: the Lithuanian Experience” (2000) 5 UNI. L.R.n.s. 243, 245.
27Mikelenas, “Unification and Harmonisation of Law at the Turn of the Millennium: the Lithuanian Experience” (2000) 5 UNI. L.R.n.s. 243, 245.
28The Free Trade Agreement with Lithuania signed in 1994 and came into force on January 1, 1995.
29 Free Trade agreement was incorporated into the European Agreement, which was signed on June 12, 1995.
30The Law on Competition No. VIII-1099 was adopted on March 23, 1999.
31The Competition Council of Lithuania, The Competition Council marks the 15th Anniversary 15 years of history (Press release, May 28, 2008) http://www.konkuren.lt
/en/index.php?show=news_view&pr_id=509 [Accessed June 30, 2012].
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in Lithuania. Further amendments to the Law on
Competition were designed to facilitate the enforcement
of EU competition rules under the new regime provided
in the Council Regulation 1/2003. Overall, since 1992
the Lithuanian Law on Competition has been amended
10 times with the latest changes being made in 2012.32
Although most of the amendments are of minor
importance, nonetheless, the frequent changes diminish
legal certainty and predictability.
IV. Legal basis for private enforcement
Private enforcement of competition law in Lithuania is
governed by the Law on Competition,33 the Code of Civil
Procedure,34 and the Civil Code.35 Specifically, art.43(1)
of the Law on Competition establishes an obligation for
undertakings that are in breach of the Law to indemnify
for damage caused to other undertakings or natural and
legal persons. However, the former Law on Competition
had narrow standing rules where only undertakings that
had been harmed were allowed to seek compensation for
damages incurred stemming from infringement of
competition law.36 The most recent Law37 rectifies this
drawback and indicates that any person (either natural or
legal) whose interests have been violated by a breach of
arts 101 TFEU or 102 TFEU, or other Lithuanian
Competition Law provisions, is entitled to bring an action
before the Vilnius Regional Court. This amendment is
welcome and may persuade not only undertakings but
also consumers to seek compensation. Attributing all
competition law cases to one court, albeit not a specialised
court, is also a positive step towards proliferation in
private litigation, as the judges will gain necessary
knowledge and experience to deal with complex
competition law cases.
According to the general rules of the Code on Civil
Procedure,38 the parties have to prove their allegation on
which they base their claims. In order to establish civil
liability and reasonably claim for compensation of
damages, the injured party must prove the following
elements: i) unlawful acts (in this case, infringement of
competition law);39 ii) damages;40 iii) causal link between
the unlawful act and damages;41 and iv) fault.42 While the
Code on Civil Procedure does not provide the standard
of proof, it is generally accepted that a claim is proven if
there are no reasonable doubts as to whether the available
evidence is substantial, relevant, and admissible.43 The
evidence must not be a misnomer and must direct to a
reasonable conclusion of the existence of the circumstance
in question.44 The burden of proof of the infringement of
the Law on Competition and of the occurrence of damage
and its amount lies on the claimant, which can be
problematic as it requires obtaining specific market data,
which usually are not accessible to injured parties. Once
the unlawful act is established the fault of the defendant
is presumed.45 However, the defendant, conversely, has
a right to refute the plaintiff’s allegations and bring in
evidence to the contrary.
Similar to other civil law systems, the Lithuanian code
of civil procedure does not provide rules on discovery.
Yet, the parties may seek the court to obtain/disclose
material from the other parties to the proceedings or from
third parties. Such claims must pre-identify requested
evidence, indicate grounds as to why this person might
possess the requested evidence and finally relevant
circumstances to be proven by such evidence.46Although
the protection of business secrets is not explicitly defined
as a ground for refusal to disclose, the court may, upon
request of the parties or ex officio, declare that the file
containing business secrets or other confidential
information is not available for public access.47
The Lithuanian Code of Civil Procedure also provides
a possibility to “secure” evidence. Namely, art.221
postulates that any persons (including the parties to the
proceedings and third parties) having grounds to believe
that it would be impossible or difficult to obtain evidence
in the future may request a court, either before or after
submitting a claim, to secure evidence.48
32No. VIII-1099March 23, 1999; No. VIII-1933, September 19, 2000; No. IX-1715, July 4, 2003; No. IX-2126, April 15, 2004; No. X-1311, October 25, 2007; No. XI-216,
April 9, 2009; No. XI-434, September 24, 2009; No. XI-1347, April 21, 2011; No. XI-1607, September 29, 2011; No. XI-1937, March 22, 2012 came into force May 1,
2012.
33March 23, 1999, No VIII-1099 with the latest amendments in 2012, March 22, 2012, No XI-1937.
34 February 28, 2002, No IX-743.
35 July 18, 2000, No VIII-1864.
36Article 50(1)(2) of the Law on Competition, September 24, 2009—No XI-434. Although ex art.50(1) provided that only undertakings were entitled to bring an action for
compensation for damages incurred, actions for damages could also be taken by consumers relying on art.43(1) ex art.46(1) of the Law.
37March 22, 2012, No XI-1937, art.47.
38Article 178, Code on Civil Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania, February 28, 2002 (in Lithuanian).
39Article 6.246 of the Civil Code.
40Article 6.249 of the Civil Code.
41Article 6.247 of the Civil Code.
42Article 6.248 of the Civil Code.
43Egidijus Lauzikas, Valentinas Mikelenas, and Vytautas Nekrosius, Civilinio proceso teisė (tr. Law of Civil Procedure) (Vilnius: Justitia, 2003), 416 (in Lithuanian).
44Lauzikas , Mikelenas and Nekrosius, Civilinio proceso teisė (2003).
45Article 6.248 of the Civil Code.
46Article 199 of the Code of Civil Procedure (in Lithuanian).
47Article 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure (in Lithuanian).
48Article 221 of the Code of Civil Procedure (in Lithuanian). The claim should indicate the evidence to be secured, circumstances to be confirmed by such evidence and
reasons for securing such evidence (art.222 of the Code of Civil Procedure). Failing to provide these explanations may result in the court rejecting the request. Also see
Jaunius Gumbis, Marius Juonys and Sarunas Keserauskas, Report: Lithuania (Commercial Dispute Resolution, 2012)http://www.cdr-news.com/component/content/article
/292-lithuania-competition-litigation [Accessed July 1, 2012].
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The private enforcement of competition law follows
the standard adversarial court procedure and the parties
have the obligation to provide evidence, to change,
decrease or increase their claims or make a settlement.49
On average, the proceedings can take from 6 to 14months
or longer depending on whether the case has exhausted
all the remedies available. The chances of accelerating
the proceedings are rather limited.50 There are three stages
of litigation: an appeal against the decision of the first
instance court, both on points of fact and law, can be
lodged with the appellate court (the Court of Appeal of
Lithuania); a further appeal (otherwise cassation), albeit
on points of law only, can be submitted to the Lithuanian
Supreme Court, whose rulings are final and subject to no
further appeal.
V. The passing-on defence and indirect
purchasers
All products pass through a production chain before
reaching the final consumer. If there is a cartel or an abuse
of dominant position at any level of the chain, purchasers
below that level face high prices. The undertakings that
are forced to pay supra-competitive prices (“direct
purchasers”) may be able to pass-on the overcharges
downstream to “indirect purchasers”, usually consumers.51
The question of whether a defendant can argue as a
defence that the claimant who was overcharged and
passed on the allegedly excessive charge to the next
purchaser and thereby suffered no damage is an important
one for the structure of private competition law
enforcement. While the Lithuanian Law on Competition
grants courts a wide degree of flexibility, due to the lack
of the case law, it is not clear whether a court would
accept the passing-on defence (i.e. the defence that allows
a defendant to escape liability in a damages action) and
the extent to which an indirect purchaser can sue.
Given that the Lithuanian law allows the broad
standing rules, theoretically an indirect purchaser is
entitled to the same right to bring a lawsuit for damages
and is subject to the same procedures as direct
purchasers.52 However, an indirect purchaser will have to
prove that the inflicted harm resulted from the actions of
the defendant, for instance, because the higher prices have
been passed on. If an indirect purchaser standing is
allowed, then to ensure just compensation, it is important
to address the passing-on defence. This is because, the
non-recognition of the defence may unjustly enrich the
direct purchaser, which is not tolerated under Lithuanian
law. Yet, the causal link between actions and benefits
may be one of the major obstacles for the efficient use of
the passing-on defence, as it would be for the defendant
to prove that higher costs had been passed on.53
VI. Damages
Similar to most Member States of the European Union,
Lithuanian courts use methods of calculating damages
available in normal civil proceedings. The aggrieved party
is entitled to full compensation for harm sustained
regardless of whether they occurred within or outside the
jurisdiction.54 There are no maximum limits to damages
as long as the claimant is able to prove them. However,
after taking into account the nature of liability, the
financial position of the parties and their relationship, the
court has the discretion to reduce the amount of damages,
if claimed full compensation would generate severe
results.55 The aggrieved party must not be enriched by
damages, meaning that punitive or exemplary damages
are not available in Lithuania. The application of leniency
policy in cartel cases grants whistle-blowers immunity
from fines, but does not release them from civil liability,
i.e. obligation to compensate for damages.56
According to the Civil Code, a claimant can demand
compensation in the form of direct (i.e. direct losses) and
indirect (i.e. indirect losses, such as loss of income or
profit) damages.57 The loss of income or profit has to be
real on which the victim could reasonably foresee.While
the scholars agree that the specific amount of damages
might be difficult to prove,58 art.6.249(2) provides that
the profit made by the defendant can be used as a measure
of damages. Additionally, art.6.249(4) amplifies that the
claimant can also seek compensation for the following
reasonable expenses: i) for the prevention or mitigation
of damages; ii) for the calculation of damages; and iii)
for recovery of damages in out-of-court proceedings.
Generally, non-material damages can be recovered in
circumstances foreseen by laws.59 Yet, they are not
possible in competition cases, as the Law on Competition
is silent vis-à-vis non-material damages.60 The limitation
period for damages claims is three years. This time period
is calculated from the moment when the victims became
aware or should become aware of the injury.
49Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, Competition Committee, Institutional and Procedural Aspects of the Relationship between Competition Authorities and
Courts, and Update on Developments in Procedural Fairness and Transparency: Lithuania (DAF/COM/WP3/WD(2011)93, October 18, 2011).
50Gumbis, Juonys andKeserauskas,Report: Lithuania (Commercial Dispute Resolution, 2012) http://www.cdr-news.com/component/content/article/292-lithuania-competition
-litigation [Accessed July 1, 2012].
51Foad Hoseinian, “Passing-OnDamages and Community Antitrust Policy, An Economic Background” (2005) 28(1)W.Comp. 3. Jakob Ruggeberg andMaarten P. Schinkel,
“Consolidating Antitrust Damages in Europe: A Proposal for Standing in Line with Efficient Private Enforcement” (2006) 29 W.Comp. 397.
52OECD Policy Roundtables, Private Remedies: Lithuania (DAF/COMP(2006)34, 2007) 223–224.
53 Jaunius Gumbis, Marius Juonys and Sarunas Keserauskas, The Lithuanian report submitted to the European Commission on Actions for Damages (Comparative study
produced Ashurst for the Competition DG, 2004) http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/study.html [Accessed November 25, 2012].
54Unless a limited liability is provided by laws or agreement between the parties. See art.6.251(1) of the Civil Code.
55Article 6.251(2) of the Civil Code.
56Note: The Heads of the European Competition Authorities expressed some concerns of the protection of leniency programmes and issued a Resolution on the Protection
of leniency material in the context of civil damages actions, May 23, 2012.
57Article 6.249(1) of the Civil Code. Also see Case No 2A-41/2006, 6.
58The Commentary of the Civil Code of the Republic of Lithuania, Book 6 “Law of Obligations”, Vol.1, (Vilnius: Justitia, 2003), p.342 (in Lithuanian).
59Article 6.250 of the Civil Code.
60Gumbis, Juonys and Keserauskas, Comparative study produced Ashurst for the Competition DG.
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Neither the Lithuanian Law on Competition nor the
current case law on damage compensation in competition
law spells out any specific economic models for the
calculation of damages leaving a large margin of
discretion to the judges.61 That causes controversies in
the establishment of the occurrence of damages and their
amount in case law. Indeed, in the UAB “Šiaulių
tara”/SPAB “Stumbras” case,62 both parties to the
proceedings submitted the findings and conclusions on
the quantity of damages incurred estimated bywell-known
international audit companies. Conversely, the amount
of damages commissioned by the claimant was over €800,
000, whereas the conclusions presented by the defendant
stated that the defendant’s actions did not inflict any
damages to the claimant whatsoever. Even though the
first instance court appointed the special State expertise
institution (i.e. the Lithuanian Court expertise centre) to
assess the damages sustained, the outcomes of the two
expert examinations (primary and the repeated) were
disregarded.63 Instead, the court chose to be guided by
the damages estimation presented by the claimant, but
reduced the amount claimed after taking into
consideration the slowdown of the growth in the
claimant’s trade volumes. Naturally, the court of appeal
overturned this part of the judgement declaring that there
was no reason to question and exclude the methods and
technique of calculating indirect damages employed by
the Lithuanian Court expertise centre. Given that the Law
on Competition does not specify any criteria under which
the damages in competition cases should be estimated,
there is no coherent approach to the quantification of
damages in Lithuania causing major concerns to litigants.
It is potentially one of the reasons for the low number of
private enforcement actions in the field of competition
law in Lithuania.
VII. Litigation costs
The issue of litigation costs inevitably leads to the
question of who pays the bill. In the course of the
proceedings each party must bear its own legal costs.
However, if one party is successful in the proceedings,
then it shall be awarded the legal costs which are covered
by the unsuccessful party. This means that similar to other
EU Member States, Lithuania employs the “loser pays”
principle, which might be seen to be too discouraging of
private enforcement.64While the recommendedmaximum
possible litigation costs are established by supplementary
acts of the Government, the courts conventionally award
litigation expenses at their own discretion. There are two
types of litigation costs: a stamp duty (i.e. the court fee
which depends on the value of the case)65 and other legal
costs encountered in supporting or contesting a lawsuit.66
Other legal costs include fees for witnesses, court
appointed experts, institutions providing services of
forensic experts and interpreters, attorney fees, service
fees, expenses related to the execution of a court’s
decision as well as other reasonable expenses which are
necessary to ensure the conduct of the hearing.67Attorney
fees are generally granted only to a limited extent. This
is because the attorney fees in Lithuania can be recovered
only in the amount authorised by law.68 Generally, one
hour of attorney service in commercial cases varies from
LT150 (€44) to LT800 (€232) depending on the lawyer’s
experience, expertise, and the complexity of the case.
However, some Lithuanian lawyers may agree a “per
case” fee. Also, art.50(2) of the Law onAdvocacy69 allows
an attorney to enter into an arrangement with a client,
where the attorney’s fee is dependent on the outcome of
the case. Thus, contingency fees are permissible in
damages actions for breach of competition law, which
can act as an encouragement in the initiation of private
enforcement.
VIII. Collective redress and
representative actions
It is widely accepted that consumers more than other
categories of victims face huge hurdles when considering
bringing a claim for damages incurred by anticompetitive
practices. Given the litigation costs and the uncertainty
in the outcome, the balance of risk and reward is hostile
61The Lithuanian lawyers seem to agree that the national courts use the methods of calculating damages in normal civil proceedings where they exercise both subjective
(concrete) and objective (abstract) calculation methods. The subjective calculation method is based on the principle of differentiation, where damages are calculated by
comparing the position of the aggrieved party before and after the infringement in question. According to the objective calculation method the value of damaged (or destroyed)
property is determined. The latter method seems to be preferred in calculating direct damages, whereas the former is used to determine indirect damages. Gumbis, Juonys
and Keserauskas, Report: Lithuania ; Valentinas Mikelenas, Problems of Civil Liability: Comparative Aspects (Vilnius: Justitia, 1995), pp.147–148 (in Lithuanian); V.
Mizaras, Civil Remedies of Infringement of Copyright (Vilnius: Justitia, 2003), pp.100–102 (in Lithuanian).
62UAB “Šiauliu tara”/SPAB “Stumbras”, No 2A-41/2006 (in Lithuanian). The case is be discussed in detail in section IX.
63OECD Policy Roundtables, Private Remedies: Lithuania (n 52).
64The European Commission raised some concerns that the “loser pays” rule might deter potential claimants from bringing damages actions. But it also admitted that it
may discourage frivolous actions. For further discussion, see Green Paper (n 4) 2.6. Also see, the European Commission, Staff Working Paper on accompanying the White
Paper on Damages Actions for breach of the EC Antitrust Rules (2 April 2008), pp.74–77, available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/anitrust/actionsdamages/files
_white_paper/working_paper.pdf [Accessed July 2, 2012]. The European Commission urged theMember States “to reflect on their cost regimes so as to facilitate meritorious
antitrust litigation, particularly for cases brought by claimants whose financial situation is significantly weaker than that of the defendant, and/or situations where costs
prevent meritorious claims being brought due to the uncertainty of the outcome” (at 75).
65Article 80 of the Code on Civil Procedure provides that “the stamp duty of 3% is charged, if the value of the claim does not exceed 100,000 Lt (approx. €28,992); claims
in the range of 100,000 Lt to 300,000 Lt (approx. €86,976) shall be subject to the stamp duty of 3,000 Lt (approx. €870) plus 2% from the amount which is above 100,000
Lt; claims exceeding 300,000 Lt shall be subject to stamp duty of 7,000 Lt (approx. €2,029) plus 1% from the amount which is above 300,000 Lt.” However, the amount
of the stamp duty may not exceed 30,000 Lt (approx. €8,698) article 80(1) of the Code on Civil Procedure (in Lithuanian).
66Article 79 of the Code on Civil Procedure (in Lithuanian).
67Article 88 of the Code on Civil Procedure (in Lithuanian).
68The April 2, 2004 Order No. 1R-85 of the Minister of Justice approved the Recommendations on the Maximum Amounts of Attorney Fees that can be Recovered in Civil
Proceedings. The Recommendations provide a general procedure for calculation of remuneration for separate actions, such as representation in the court, drafting the claim
etc. The actual amount of attorney fees which may be recovered from a losing party is determined on an individual basis (in Lithuanian).
69Law on Advocacy, No. IX-2066, March 18, 2004.
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to consumers.70 This means that consumers are not
compensated for their loss caused by anticompetitive
practices. To address this issue, the European Commission
proposed two mechanisms of collective redress in the
White Paper: i) representative actions; and ii) collective
actions.71 In representative actions, usually consumer or
trade associations or other qualified entities take legal
action on behalf of the victims. Whereas in collective
actions a group of persons with the same matter and
demand can pool their small claims and have their day
in court.72
With respect to the first option, Lithuania has had
representative action mechanism for several years in the
Law on Consumer Protection of Lithuania,73 which
enables the State Consumer Rights Protection Authority
or certain qualifying consumer associations to take
enforcement action to protect the public interest of
consumers. Specifically, a claimmay include prohibition
(termination) of certain actions (omissions) of a seller or
service provider whereby legitimate common interests of
consumers are being infringed upon and which are unfair
from the consumers’ viewpoint, are not in compliance
with fair business practices or are in conflict with the
provisions of the Lithuanian Civil Code, the Law on
Consumer Protection of Lithuania or any other legislative
acts, including the Law on Competition.74 While actions
brought by consumer protection institutions or public
consumer organisations in the defence of public interest
of consumers are possible, they cannot claim
indemnification for damages. Unfortunately, these
representative actions have never been explored in
competition law cases and on the whole they do not
provide full benefits for consumers due to their limitation
to claim damages.
The second mechanism of collective redress in
Lithuania is also disappointing. While, theoretically,
art.49(6) of the Code of Civil Procedure75 provides that
a group action76 may be submitted to protect public
interest in accordance to the law, further provisions
specifying the procedure for handling a class action were
“forgotten” to be adopted. These difficulties are exhibited
in the V.J/Republic of Lithuania case,77 where the first
instance court and subsequently the Court of Appeal in
2009 refused to accept a class action for consideration
due to the lack of class action mechanisms in place
enabling the courts to deal with a class action in
Lithuania.78 This is because there are no laws specifying
what type of claim could be identified as a group action,
who has a right to the group action, what the requirements
for the content of such a claim are, what the procedures
for launching and examining such claims in court are and
finally what legal power of a decision based on a class
action would be.79
Therefore, collective consumer antitrust actions could
not be regarded as a genuinely relevant cause of action
and are currently not enforceable in practice in Lithuania.
Reflecting this legislative gap the Lithuanian Government
approved a class action concept80 in July 2011 and the
Lithuanian Parliament is currently in the process of
preparing the necessary amendments to the existing laws.
There have been fierce debates revolving around the
choice of two models available for implementing class
actions, such as opt-out and opt-in or a combination of
them.81 Under the opt-in model the claimants must take
action to be included in the class, whereas in the opt-out
system claimants, who have the same interest, are
automatically included in the class by default unless they
express exclusion from the class. Although the opt-out
model can reduce the defendant and court’s costs, as it
guarantees one court proceeding, the Lithuanian
Government, nonetheless, expressed that this model may
be contrary to the Lithuanian Constitution and art.6 of
the European Convention on Human Rights, as it violates
the rights of any victim who might participate in the
procedure unknowingly and yet would be bound by the
court’s decision (otherwise, a victim may not have an
opportunity to speak in their own court proceeding).82
The mix of two models, where a judge after taking
individual circumstances into account decides which
model should be applied to a specific case was also
rejected due to the fact that most Lithuanian judges lack
the qualifications to make such a decision and it also may
delay the litigation process.83 The opt-in system has been
recommended as the best option for Lithuania. However,
this model is not without its shortcomings. The scholars
warn that “[r]equiring the individuals affirmatively to
request inclusion in the lawsuit would result in freezing
out the claims of people—especially small claims held
70Neelie Kroes, ‘Making consumers’ right to damages a reality: the case for collective redress mechanisms in antitrust claims’ (SPEECH/07/698, November 9, 2007,
Lisbon).
71White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach of the EC antitrust rules.
72There is extensive literature on this topic. For instance, see Joseph A. Grundfest and Michael A. Perino, “The Pentium Papers: A Case Study of Collective Institutional
Investor Activism in Litigation” (1996) 38 Ariz. L.Rev. 559 (“the class action device is an attempt to overcome the problem of dispersed injured parties whose damage
claims are sufficiently small that they lack incentive to pursue individual litigation. Absent the class action device, collective action problems can prevent the aggregation
of individual claims into one action that would support economically viable litigation” at 563). Also see, Alexandra Lahav, “Fundamental Principles for Class Action
Governance” (2003) 37 Ind.L.Rev. 65 (“class actions solve the collection problems faced by individuals with claims too small to be economically adjudicated individually”
at 70).
73Article 30 of the Law on Consumer Protection, No. I-657, November 10, 1994 as amended by No. X-1014, Jaunuary 12, 2007.
74Gumbis, Juonys and Keserauskas, Comparative study produced Ashurst for the Competition DG.
75Article 49(5) of the former Code of Civil Procedure (in Lithuanian).
76Although the Lithuanian Code of Civil Procedure refers to a group action, it has the same meaning as a class action. Therefore a group action and class action will be
used interchangeably in this paper.
77Note: it was not a competition case.
78Case No 2-492/2009, 4 (in Lithuanian).
79Case No 2-492/2009.
80The Government of the Republic of Lithuania, Resolution with regard to the Concept of a Group Action Approval, July 13, 2011, No. 885, Vilnius (in Lithuanian).
81The Government of the Republic of Lithuania, Resolution with regard to the Concept of a Group Action Approval, 14.1.
82The Government of the Republic of Lithuania, Resolution with regard to the Concept of a Group Action Approval, 14.1.2.
83The Government of the Republic of Lithuania, Resolution with regard to the Concept of a Group Action Approval, 14.1.3.
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by small people—who for one reason or another,
ignorance, timidity, unfamiliarity with business or legal
matters, will simply not take the affirmative step. […] In
[such] circumstances […] it seems fair for the silent to
be considered as part of the class.”84 There is also a risk
that after the initial class action a defendant may still face
a large group of consumers that may attempt to use the
precedent value of the initial successful opt-in class action
as a “free ride” to bring waves of successive individual
claims.85While the opt-in model is suggested to heed, the
government recommended reviewing it in the future and
potentially introducing a system to mix the two models,
leaving the door open to revisit the issue later.
The Government’s resolution also proposed other
suggestions. For example, it postulated to define the
categories in which a class action would be possible,
which embrace compensating victims stemming from the
infringement of competition law.86 The group members
will have to meet certain requirements. First of all, it will
be a quantitative criterion (i.e. the minimum number of
a group, such as 20). Secondly, all members will have to
share a common interest in a case.87 Other proposals
include a compulsory representation of an attorney in
class action cases.88 Higher hierarchy courts are
recommended to deal with class action cases, such as
regional and regional administrative courts.89 Owing that
a class action is more efficient than individual claims, the
Lithuanian government suggests a lower stamp duty to
encourage class actions in Lithuania.90
In order to implement this concept of a class action in
practice, both the Code of Civil procedure and the Code
of Administrative procedure will have to be amended. It
is unclear when exactly such laws would be passed
through the Lithuanian Parliament or what would be their
content. Thus for the time being a class action is simply
impossible in the Lithuanian legal system. Any attempt
to launch one should result in a refusal by the courts to
treat it as a class action; instead the court may understand
it as several individual claims filed together where all the
injured parties will be considered as the parties to the
proceedings and will be under obligation to defend their
claim.
IX. Private enforcement of competition
law in Lithuania: case studies
Private enforcement is not only governed by the
institutional setting and the formulation of legal rules,
but also by non-written factors, such as the willingness
of victims to take legal action and judges to make use of
existing flexibilities.91 While the Lithuanian laws
recognise the right to damages for the violation of
competition rules, there are only a limited number of
cases that have taken this opportunity. The positive theory
of litigation claims that litigation increases and even
prevails over settlements outside the courts where the
party is optimistic about its chances of trial.92
Unfortunately, there is no “success” story in Lithuania in
private enforcement of competition law. From 2000 to
2012 there were two partially successful cases, out of
these one damages action and one injunction case; and
three unsuccessful judgements (i.e. one damages case and
two defence cases).
Figure “Successful” cases
One of the few actions that could be characterised as
“partially successful” was UAB “Šiaulių tara”/SPAB
“Stumbras”.93 This is a follow-on action, where the
claimant Šaulių tara lodged a complaint to the
Competition Council alleging that the defendant SPAB
“Stumbras”, while enjoying a dominant position in the
strong alcoholic beverages market in the course of
2000–2002 applied discriminating conditions to
equivalent marketing service agreements with certain
undertakings, including the claimant, therefore placing
Šaulių tara, which was unable to sell the products at a
lower price, at a competitive disadvantage. Based on the
Competition Council’s decision that actions by Stumbras
constituted a breach of art.9(3) of the Law on
Competition, the claimant sought the first instance court
to award LT2,864,809 (approx. €829,706) damages,
including both direct and indirect losses. The Kaunas
Regional court, the first instance court, partly satisfied
the claim. The court acknowledged that Stumbras abused
its dominant position and therefore the claimant was
entitled to damages. However, it awarded a lower
amount— LT500,000 in damages (approx. €144,810)
84Benjamin Kaplan, “Continuing Work of the Civil Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure” (I) (1967) 81 Harv. L. Rev. 356, 397–398.
85Werner Eyskens and Nanyi Kaluma, “Opt-out is Hardly an Option Chapter—Class and Group Actions 2012”, The International Comparative Legal Guide to Class and
Group Actions, (GLG 2012) Ch.4.
86The Government of the Republic of Lithuania, Resolution with regard to the Concept of a Group Action Approval, 15.
87The Government of the Republic of Lithuania, Resolution with regard to the Concept of a Group Action Approval, 16.
88The Government of the Republic of Lithuania, Resolution with regard to the Concept of a Group Action Approval, 19.2.
89The Government of the Republic of Lithuania, Resolution with regard to the Concept of a Group Action Approval, 19.1.
90The Government of the Republic of Lithuania, Resolution with regard to the Concept of a Group Action Approval, 19.5
91Andreas Heinemann, “The Rise of a Private Competition Law Culture: Experience and Visions” in Jurgen Basedow, (et al.) (eds), Private Enforcement of Competition
Law (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2011), pp.218–229.
92Bruce K. Hay and Kathryn E.Spier, “Litigation and Settlement” in Peter Newman (ed)New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law (London: PalgraveMacmillan,
1998), pp. 442, 444.
93UAB “Šiauliu tara”/SPAB “Stumbras”, No 2A-41/2006 (in Lithuanian).
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than claimed by the claimant. UAB “Šiaulių tara”
appealed that the reduction of damages was unjustified.
The Court of Appeal of Lithuania expressed that an
infringement decision by a national competition authority
has probative value in Lithuania94 and that the defendant
abused its dominant position. Although the court agreed
that the claimant was entitled to the compensation, it
stated that Šaulių tara failed to prove the whole amount
of the requested damages and therefore reduced the
damages claimed even further down to LT301,633.37
(approx. €87,359). The main focus of this case was on
the calculation of damages. The court stressed that the
claimant must prove indirect damages, such as loss of
income and they should be realistic rather than just
probable. Consequently, AB “Stumbras” reached a
settlement out of court with other claimants, UAB
“Belvedere prekyba” and UAB “Palink”, where similar
to Šiaulių tara sustained damages stemming from
Stumbras violation of competition law.
In the second damages case, which was largely
unsuccessful, the claimant LUAB “Klevo lapas” filed a
lawsuit against the defendant AB “ORLEN Lietuva”,95
claiming that AB “ORLEN Lietuva” subsidiary AB
“Mazeikių nafta”, while holding a dominant position
provided exclusive conditions of distribution of its oil
products to a limited number of companies, by fixing
exclusive discounts of gasoline and diesel fuel to them.
The claimant argued that these discriminating conditions
placed it at a competitive disadvantage making it very
hard to compete on the oil products market and
subsequently forced it out of the market. Upon Klevo
lapas’s request the Competition Council of Lithuania
initiated the proceedings against AB “Mazeikių nafta”
and concluded that Mazeikių nafta held a dominant
position in some gasoline and diesel fuel markets and by
taking advantage of its unilateral decisive influence in
the markets, fixed dissimilar purchase conditions of its
oil products for similar agreements with different
companies. The Council therefore decided thatMazeikių
nafta abused its dominant position under art.9(1)3 of the
Law on Competition and imposed a maximum fine of
LT100,000 (approx. €30,000) at the time. Although
Mazeikių nafta appealed the decision twice, both the
Vilnius Regional Administrative court and the Supreme
Administrative court of Lithuania upheld the Competition
Council’s decision.
Pursuant to the findings of an infringement of art.9 of
the Law on Competition by the Competition Council, the
claimant LUAB “Klevo lapas” brought a follow-on action
against the parent company AB “ORLEM Lietuva” in
order to recover LT36,606,156.42 (approx. €10,601,868)
in damages. The court of first instance and the Court of
Appeal of Lithuania rejected the claim as unfounded. The
reasoning of the court of first instance is rather
conflicting. The court stated that there was no reason to
suggest that the defendant applied dissimilar competitive
conditions for the claimant,96 undermining the decision
of the Competition Council. It then argued that Klevo
lapas was in a bad financial position before the
defendant’s discounted prices to the certain undertakings
and therefore it was not the defendant’s fault for its
insolvency. The Court of Appeal also concluded that the
claim was unproven. However, in its reasoning it stated
that the prohibiting decision of the Competition Council
againstMazeikių nafta for its abuse of a dominant position
and the bankruptcy of UAB “Klevo lapas” lacked the
causality. The case was further appealed to the Supreme
Court of Lithuania, the last resort court. Owing to the
fact, that this was the first competition law case in private
enforcement in the Supreme Court, the court provided a
more comprehensive reasoning. First of all, the court
referred to the Courage and Crehan case97 and declared
that in the absence of Union rules, it is for the national
legal system of eachMember State to designate the courts
and to lay down the detailed procedural rules governing
actions for compensation. Accordingly, general national
provisions apply in order to prove civil liability and claim
compensation stemming from an infringement of
competition law in Lithuania. This means that the decision
of the Competition Council of an infringement of
competition law proves only one of the conditions, the
unlawful fact. Other conditions, such as actual damages
and the causal link between the unlawful act and the
damages must be proven by an aggrieved party. An
infringement of the competition rules on its own is
insufficient to seek damages. Secondly, the court focused
on the causality. The court rejected the claimant’s
argument that had Klevo lapas an opportunity to receive
the products at a discounted rate it would have stayed in
the market. In parallel to the court of first instance and
the Court of Appeal, it held that the claimant was in a bad
financial position before the infringement of competition
law occurred. This led to the conclusion that Klevo lapas
was forced to declare bankruptcy not because of the
defendant’s anti-competitive practice, but because of its
poor business management. On the grounds that there
was no causal link between the infringement of
competition law and the requested damages, the court
rejected the claim upholding the previous courts’
decisions.
The final damages case and the first case in Lithuania
with an international element is AB “flyLAL-Lithuanian
Airlines” / “Air Baltic Corporation” A/S and Airport
“Ryga”,98 which is pending. The claimant AB
“flyLAL-Lithuanian Airlines” argued that the defendants
Latvian firm “Air Baltic Corporation” A/S and the
Latvian airport “Ryga” infringed both arts 101 TFEU and
102 TFEU and therefore the claimant is seeking
94Article 197 of the Code of Civil Procedure (in Lithuanian).
95Case No. 3K-3-207/2010, May 17, 2010 (in Lithuanian).
96Case No. 3K-3-207/2010, 2 (in Lithuanian).
97Case C-453/99, para 29 (in Lithuanian).
98Case No. 2-230-881/2012 (in Lithuanian).
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LT199,830,000 (approx. €57,874,761) in damages.
Specifically, the defendant’s dominant position and
exclusive discounts in the international airport Riga
allowed it to apply relatively low prices in the Vilnius
airport, making it difficult for flyLAL-Lithuanian Airlines
to compete. This is a follow-on action, as the claimant’s
lawsuit is supported by the decision of the Latvian
Competition Council, which confirmed that Air Baltic
Corporation infringed the competition law rules.99 After
initiating a private enforcement action, a person is entitled
to claim for all interim relief measures that are available
in civil action procedures in Lithuania.100 Therefore, the
claimant was partially successful in securing the
precautionarymeasures. The Court of Appeal of Lithuania
agreed to freeze the defendant’s property for the amount
of the grievance.101 But other interim measures, such as
disallowing Airport “Ryga” to apply exclusive discounts
to “Air Baltic Corporation” A/S and other actions that
infringe the competition rules were rejected, as the
measures were too closely related to the merits of the
case.102
Sometimes undertakings use competition law as a
shield in their defences, for example, where one party to
an agreement freely entered into, attempts to walk away
from it on the ground that it is void under art.5 of the Law
on Competition (equivalent to art.101 TFEU). As a rule
of thumb, these cases are usually unsuccessful. For
example, in the damage claim case for breach of contract,
UAB “MBR parduotuvių ir restoranu iranga” / IĮ E.A.,103
the court held that art.5 of the Law on Competition was
not applicable for themutual commercial agency contract,
where both parties agreed that the defendant acting as a
commercial agent would conclude contracts in the
principal’s name and at the latter’s expense as well as in
his interests and would not design or consult the
competitors’ equipment or otherwise act in competition
to the claimant. Another unsuccessful case, although on
a slightly different ground, was UAB “Naftos grupe” /
AB “Klaipedos nafta”,104where the claimantNaftos grupe
filed a lawsuit against the defendant Klaipedos nafta and
sought compensation of damages for a breach of contract.
In its counter-claim the defendant argued that the contract
was void, as it violated art.5 of the Law on Competition.
The Klaipeda’s Regional Court (the court of first instance
in this case) concluded that only the Vilnius Regional
Court has exclusive jurisdiction to deal with cases that
involved infringement of the competition rules.105 The
Court of Appeal upheld the decision.
Given a limited number of cases in private
enforcement of competition law in Lithuania, one may
question whether Lithuanian courts even though they
seem to follow the EU practice truly uphold the principle
of effectiveness,106 making it practically possible or
excessively easy to exercise the rights (such as the right
to damages stemming from infringement of competition
law) conferred by Union law. Lithuania is confronted
with a conundrum. On the one hand, the injured parties
in Lithuania are not active, as they are reluctant to seek
redress due to the low expectation to be successful. On
the other hand, the judges are unwilling to be more
flexible with regard to the causality and quantum of
damages, the two biggest obstacles in private enforcement
of competition law in Lithuania. This is most likely due
to the extremely scarce experience in the litigation of this
type.
X. Why there is little practice of private
enforcement in Lithuania?
The existing legal basis is sufficient for private
enforcement of competition law in Lithuania, save
collective redress. Yet, the actual practice is rare. It is
only in the field of unfair competition that private parties
are engaged in direct litigation, especially with regard to
trademark infringements. It can be articulated that little
practice of private enforcement in competition law in
Lithuania can be attributed to a number of factors.
First of all, the non-litigious nature of Lithuanian
society is to be condemned. Historically, the clutches of
the Soviet Union precluded the Lithuanian legal system
from development. This meant that modern private
enforcement in Lithuania is relatively new and therefore
lacks a litigation tradition.
Secondly, competition law cases are of immense
complexity. The older generation of the Lithuanian
judiciary who obtained their degrees in law during the
Soviet era, does not have enough knowledge of sound
competition law (which was non-existent in the Soviet
era) and experience to deal with multifaceted legal and
economic matters.107 Steps were taken to change a
deep-rooted socialist mentality and to re-educate judges
to the new rules of the game enabling them to understand
the principles of market economy. However, the low
number of case law in the competition law field suggests
that the Lithuanian judiciary has not yet built enough
confidence to takemore courageous steps in private legal
proceedings (i.e. as there are barely any successful
damage cases in competition law). This in turn potentially
99The Latvian Competition Council, the Decision of November 22, 2006.
100Article 148(3) of the Code on Civil Procedure (in Lithuanian).
101Case No. 2-949/2008 (in Lithuanian).
102 See Table 1.
103Case No. 2A-79/2004 (in Lithuanian).
104Case No. 2-2655/2011 (in Lithuanian).
105Article 47(1) of the Law on Competition, March 22, 2012, No XI-1937.
106As defined in the Courage and Crehan (C-453/99) [2002] Q.B. 507; [2001] 3 W.L.R. 1646 at [29]. The Court did not attach any explicit equivalent requirement to the
damages remedy for breach of competition law in this case, therefore national rules on causation apply.
107Aini Proos, OECD Global Forum on Competition, Contribution from Estonia (CCNM/GF/COMP/WD(2002)5, February 5, 2002). Vitalis Nakrosis, “Assessing
Governmental Capacities to Manage European Affairs: the Case of Lithuania” in Vello Pettai and Jan Zielonka, (eds) The Road to the European Union, Estonia, Latvia
and Lithuania (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003).
Private Enforcement of Competition Law in Lithuania: a Story of Underdevelopment 133
[2013] G.C.L.R., Issue 3 © 2013 Thomson Reuters (Professional) UK Limited and Contributors
sows the seeds of lack of trust by society in the judicial
system—the high costs of litigation and slim chances of
the requested damages to be awarded leads to the
conclusion that the litigation is not worth taking (“there
is no point to seek redress in courts as the outcome will
be unsatisfactory anyway”).
Thirdly, it is difficult to calculate and prove damages,
as the Lithuanian case law reveals. It is often problematic
for claimants to obtain the necessary information and
evidence to substantiate their claims. There are
insufficient experts in Lithuania to calculate damages (i.e.
there are only two experts in the Forensic Science Centre
of Lithuania108).109 The amounts awarded by the courts are
insignificant (approx. €87,359 in the UAB “Šiaulių
tara”/SPAB “Stumbras” case,110 only 11 per cent of the
claimed amount). There is a desperate need for national
guidelines on quantification of damages in Lithuania.
Fourthly, it is challenging for the claimant to prove
causation and attribute loss specifically to the defendant’s
behaviour rather than the claimant’s poor business
strategy or other factors, such as a general economic
slowdown in Lithuania. A high standard of proof can be
seen in the LUAB “Klevo lapas”/ AB “ORLEN Lietuva”
case, where the claimant Klevo lapas failed to prove
successfully the existence of damage caused by a shortfall
of a business opportunity available to the claimant’s
competitors and instead the claimant’s inadequate
business management was to blame.111 Potentially,
lowering the standard of proof could improve the current
situation.
Fifthly, it is undisputed that private enforcement
produces substantial costs on the side of persons (natural
or legal). Therefore, expensive and prolonged litigation
is one of the other obstacles for private enforcement in
Lithuania. For instance, the litigation in the case LUAB
“Klevo lapas”/ AB “ORLEN Lietuva”112 lasted 10 years113
reaching the court of last resort—the Supreme Court of
Lithuania, where the claim was rejected. Thus, rules on
litigation costs could be relaxed to protect weaker parties.
Sixthly, an obvious obstacle to the growth of private
enforcement in Lithuania is the current unavailability of
procedural mechanisms for bringing class action lawsuits.
Without this mechanism there are currently no practical
possibilities of aggregating damages of a large group of
consumers, which especially limit consumers’
opportunities to obtain redress, as it is impractical for
individual consumers to initiate private enforcement
actions against cartels or monopolists. Class action is
important not just because it enables a group of consumers
with small claims to secure relief, but also—even more
significantly—it goes beyond individual benefits of the
parties, as it produces external benefits for society. By
explicating the externalities theory of the small claims
class action, Professor Rubenstein elaborated that the
lawsuit might develop legal principles, change industry
practices, or even conserve judicial and social resources.114
Besides the economic theories, absence of a collective
action framework in Lithuania undermines wider social
goals, such as access to justice and equal treatment and
levelling the playing field between the defaulting
undertaking and its competitors.115
Finally, the relationship between public and private
enforcement is rather fragile in Lithuania. It is essential
to align the public and private interest in private
enforcement of competition law. While private
enforcement seems to be compensatory in nature, it must
not be ignored that it can also help to pursue the public
interest goal of deterrence. In their pioneering work
Becker and Stigler argued that deterrence could be as
effectively achieved if private individuals enforced the
law by competing for the high damages.116 Therefore,
further encouragement of the Competition Council is
necessary (i.e. either through its own involvement in
private litigation or some indication of possible damages)
in order to establish a more fertile environment for private
action in competition law.
XI. Concluding remarks
A traditional approach in Lithuania is to complain to “the
watchdog”—the Competition Council, which is entrusted
with the enforcement of the Law on Competition. Private
enforcement in Lithuania is still in its infancy. Although
any legal or natural person, whose interest has been
violated from breaches of competition law, may seek
compensation for direct and indirect damages, practically
the related cases are scarce in Lithuania. There have been
only a handful of cases (i.e. compensation for damages
caused by allegedly abusive dominance by the major oil
refinery in the Baltic sea, and one of the leading
108The Forensic Science Centre of Lithuania (www.ltec.lt).
109Dr Irmantas Norkus, the partner of the Raidla Lejins & Norcous, the paper presented during the conference on private enforcement in Lithuania, December 14, 2011 (in
Lithuanian).
110Case No 2A-41/2006 (in Lithuanian).
111Case No. 3K-3-207/2010 (in Lithuanian).
112Case No. 3K-3-207/2010 (in Lithuanian).
113 Jurate Šoviene “The Relationship between Public and Private Enforcement in Lithuania” presented at the seminar on December 14, 2011, Vilnius, Lithuania.
114William B. Rubenstein, “Why Enable Litigation?: A Positive Externalities Theory of the Small Claims Class Action” (2006) 74 UMKC L. Rev. 709. Prof. Rubenstein
explored further Posner’s sketches and grouped the positive externalities of individual lawsuits into four types of effects: i) degree effects; ii) settlement effects; iii) threat
effects; and finally iv) institutional effects. First, degree effects mean that the legal principle developed in the case will build more certainty in structuring social behaviour
and lower the need for future adjudication of the decided issue. Second, settlements can also change behaviour beyond the initial parties and can also reduce future litigation
costs by establishing settlement ranges and preserving judicial resources. Third, the very threat of litigation can also change a firm’s behaviour and the risk of litigation is
included in its decision-making. Finally, with respect to the institutional effects, by enabling litigation, the class action has structural consequences—shifting a significant
amount of enforcement from public agencies to the private sector. Also see, Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law, 6th edn (New York: Aspen Publishers, 2003),
pp.530–531.
115These social objectives were indicated in the report of the DG for Internal Policies Overview of Existing Collective Redress Schemes in EU Member States July 2011.
116Gary S. Becker and George J. Stigler, “Law Enforcement, Malfeasance and Compensation of Enforcers” (1974) 3 J.L.S. 1. Also see Gary S. Becker, “Crime and
Punishment: An Economic Approach” (1968) 76 J.P.E. 169.
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manufacturers and exporters of alcoholic beverages in
Lithuania and most recently the airport case, which is still
pending), even fewer of these were successful. A couple
of cases117 ended in litigation settlement. Although
settlements may be desirable as they save administrative
costs, they “cannot therefore contribute to the same extent
as judgements to the clarification and a better
understanding of the competition rules”.118All these cases
were invoked either by a competitor or undertaking that
suffered loss from breaches of competition law and sought
redress. There has been no single claim raised by a
consumer. This can be explicated by the lack of provisions
specifying a class action in Lithuania, where a group of
consumers with small demands could collectively initiate
a claim in court. The rare use of courts in Lithuania can
also be attributed to a number of factors which include
the complexity of cases, difficulties in calculating
damages and proving the causation, expensive and
prolonged litigation (for instance, the litigation in the case
LUAB “Klevo lapas”/AB “ORLEN Lietuva” lasted 10
years and was ultimately rejected), and, arguably, the
non-litigious nature of the Lithuanian society119 or a fear
to fail, as there has not been any successful stories in
private enforcement of competition law. Yet, it has to be
acknowledged that the authoritative conclusion cannot
be made given the small volume of private enforcement
of competition law occurring in Lithuania.
There have been some recent positive developments
in Lithuania. For example, the recently amended Law on
Competition provides the broad standing rules and no
longer contains any limitations as to who can seek
damages in private enforcement. A single court—the
Vilnius Regional Court—has the exclusive jurisdiction
as the court of first instance to deal with competition cases
in private enforcement in Lithuania concentrating
expertise and knowledge in the field in one hand. The
Parliament is in the process of introducing new provisions
enabling collective redress to be workable in practice.
Yet, there are still some steps that can be taken in order
to cure some of the drawbacks, such as improving
competition law awareness and the education of the
judiciary, businesses and consumers. Public
encouragement can be useful to build victims confidence
to take legal action and to provide some financial support
for weaker parties. Other measures include expanding
the rights of public bodies protecting collective interests,
issuing guidelines explaining the application of various
economic models for the calculation of damages,
potentially lowering the standard of proof, and improving
the relationship between public and private enforcement.
For instance, the Competition Council of Lithuania can
take action in its own hands and claim damages where
the state or other public entities have suffered as a result
of anti-competitive practice.
While it is unlikely to expect any dramatic positive
changes in private enforcement in the near future in
Lithuania, the necessary developments are taking place
and the improvements should gradually bear fruitful
results.
117Cases UAB “Belvedere prekyba” / SPAB “Stumbras” and UAB “Palink” / SPAB “Stumbras” (in Lithuanian).
118 Francis G. Jacobs and Thomas Deisenhofer, “Procedural Aspects of the Effective Private Enforcement of EC Competition Rules: a Community Perspective”, in Claus
D. Ehlermann and Isabela Atanasiu (eds), European Competition Law Annual 2001: Effective Private Enforcement of EC Antitrust Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2003),
pp.183–227.
119Dr Irmantas Norkus, paper presented during the conference on private enforcement in Lithuania, December 14, 2011.
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